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Abstract 
Emergency Services Agencies (ESA) are required to co-operate and collaborate on a regular basis to 
provide their communities with warning information about disasters and incidents. Community Warning 
(CW) systems are a vital component of ESA operations as there are many different types of disasters and 
emergency scenarios of varying complexity and uncertainty, which in turn directly influence the type of 
CW systems that should be employed by an ESA for any particular incident. 
This paper outlines research conducted into CW systems in New South Wales (NSW) state government 
ESA. This research highlights a unified collaborative approach to the assessment, development, 
deployment and use of CW systems that is based on crisis management theory. This approach could be 
utilised by governments at federal, state and local levels for cross border and jurisdictional management 
of ESA informational, ICT and process resources. Such an approach would assist government in better 
targeting expenditure on CW systems and using ICT in an innovative manner. 
Results also highlight that when developing and deploying CW systems, there should be careful 
consideration of a number of background contextual issues such as: stakeholder involvement, incident 
complexity; utilisation of multi-ICT delivery platforms for economies of scale; integration of multi-ESA 
operational, community, communication and ICT requirements for shared direction; and development of 
an ICT architecture for building learning capabilities and skills of stakeholders. 
1. Introduction 
The efficacy of community warning (CW) systems and emergency incident response (EIR) activities is 
now a critical issue to be resolved by global government, especially in relation to disasters caused by 
extreme climate events such as hailstorms, fires, floods, cyclones and other events such as biohazards, 
pandemics, refugee movements, terrorism and the like. In Australia, most recently, we have witnessed the 
impact of the Sydney Hailstorm – April, 1999, NSW Bushfires – 2002, 2005, Canberra Bushfires – 
January 2003, Queensland Tropical Cyclone “Larry” - March 2006, Hunter Floods – June 2007, Equine 
Flu – 2007-2008, Victorian Bushfires - February 2009 and Queensland Floods – February and May 2009. 
New South Wales (NSW) is an Australian state with a population of approximately 6,889,100 people 
nearly all of whom live on or near the coast or in the capital of Sydney which houses 4,284,379 of the 
total NSW population (ABS 2008). The damage caused by natural disasters in NSW has been estimated at 
$992 million per annum. Risk Frontiers Quarterly suggests that NSW suffers more of each type of 
emergency (apart from Cyclones) than any other jurisdiction (Anonymous 2006).  
Traditionally, approaches to CW and EIR by Emergency Services Agencies (ESA) have focussed around 
invoking command and control systems and structures around CM and EIR activities (Kost & Moyer 
2003, COE 2005, OESC 2006, ACT AGO 2007). The immediacy of a threat, the impact on the 
community and the downstream management of the threat and impact, generally means that government 
and their ESA have to mobilise quickly and efficiently to deal with differing and emergent scenarios. In 
dealing with a crisis, government rarely has the luxury of completely understanding, harnessing and 
managing collaborative and inter-organisational information management and processes to optimise 
outcomes in an emergency incident or disaster. Stakeholder characteristics are generally highly complex 
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and difficult to manage in these scenarios as well, with different levels and location of government and 
their ESA, various community groups, businesses and individuals, as well as their information and 
communications technology (ICT) service and product providers, all requiring co-ordination and attention 
to their individual requirements and needs at any given time. This complexity is also magnified as each 
organisation or group has their own individual culture, structure and way of doing things, which must also 
be accommodated. In most cases, effective community warning can mean the difference between 
inconvenience and disaster for those who are affected (Blanchard-Boehm 1998, Betts 2003, Kost & 
Moyer 2003, Sikich 2005, Tarrant 2005). Incidents such as the WTC (2001), Bali (2002) and London 
(2005) bombings, the South East Asian tsunami (2004) as well as Hurricane Katrina in the US in 2005 
give us prime examples of the complexity of information use for community warning purposes in these 
situations (OESC 2006). 
This often leads to critical problems and miscommunications between CW and EIR stakeholders in times 
of crisis. Information processing delays, replication and double handling; duplicate and inconsistent 
recording and storage of data; and system errors resulting in unnecessary costs, resource wastage and 
ineffective response are all problems which routinely present themselves in these situations. Providing 
better integrated and more collaborative management information and processes around the organisations, 
people, systems and ICT infrastructure that support CW and EIR is a paradigmatic shift in the way that 
we think about government, ESAs and their interaction with the community.  
CW systems are defined by the NSW Office of Emergency Services (OES) as systems responsible for the 
“effective delivery of a message to influence behaviour”. The elements of CW systems are therefore: 
 Effective delivery - a range of methods and media; 
 Of a  message - clear, consistent and from a trusted source; and 
 To influence behaviour - people do something that reduces risk to them or their property. 
CW systems are also highly reliant on the effective evaluation and deployment of ICT innovations and in 
many instances the full potential of these innovations is not realised, due to the different approaches to 
community warning taken by ESA as well as their dispersed geographical locations.  
2. Background Theories 
Many of the theories that underpin CW and EIR have been developed in the crisis management literature. 
Crisis management has long been a focal point for management theorists as organisations prepare to cope 
with natural and man-made crisis events (Pearson and Mitroff 1993, Pauchant et al. 1992, Pearson and 
Clair 1998). Pearson and Mitroff (1993) argue that there are 4 types of crisis variable: types; phases; 
systems; and stakeholders. Types of crisis influence: organisational preparation; scope of crisis plans; 
crises that can be safely ignored; and rationale for inclusion/exclusion of a crisis. Phases of a crisis affect: 
timing; detailed activities; phase management; and reactivity versus pro-activity. Systems: can cause or 
prevent crises; may not be well understood; are comprised of complex components (technology, people, 
process, organisations, emotions) and their interaction. Stakeholders: can affect and be affected by crisis 
management approaches; and need to be systematically analysed and anticipated in a crisis.  
Pauchant et al. (1992) advocate the need in crisis management “for going beyond operational matters - pg 
70” in the development of strategic plans and processes. These must focus on: relations a firm has with 
the environment; how it deals with its stakeholders; involvement of top management; survival and 
development of the organisation as a whole; consistent patterns of actions; and development of crisis 
management as an emergent process. Pearson and Clair (1998) build an integrated model of crisis 
management which points to: the need for collaboration and collective intra and inter-organisational 
action for effective crisis management with attention to be paid to; organisational culture; risk 
perceptions; crisis preparations; individual and shared assumptions; establishment of crisis management 
teams; and building of alliances and co-ordination of crisis management plans through candid information 
sharing with critical external stakeholders.  
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The next section of the paper deals with defining inter-organisational ESA collaboration through the use 
of negotiated arrangements theory as it is applied to crisis management and CW issues.  We then detail 
our research questions, objective and methods, data collection and analysis and then finally define our 
contribution to research and practice regarding CW systems and areas for further research. 
3. Inter-Organisational (ESA) Collaboration and Negotiated Arrangements Theory 
As a result of the focus within crisis management theory, this study has utilised negotiated arrangements 
theory to explain phenomena in ESA collaboration for the support and utilisation of CW systems and 
innovations (see Figure 1). Negotiation is an important part of organisational collaboration so when 
organisations agree on an issue, negotiation is used to find the best way or the best solution to address a 
task. On the other hand, when organisations ‘agree to disagree’ on a particular issue, negotiation is about 
an organisation’s willingness to compromise in order to find common ground. When organisations (or 
emergency services agencies in the case of this study) collaborate, they have to come to terms with having 
a common strategy, common business processes and ICT architectural design.  
Negotiated order theory has been used to study the social process of collaboration by which order is 
negotiated (Gray 1985). “Negotiated order theory thus focuses on the symbolic and perceptual aspects of 
interorganisational relationships, particularly on the evolution of shared understandings among 
stakeholders of the domain’s structures and processes, limits and possibilities” (Gray and Wood 1991, p. 
10). The approach taken by this theory is to examine the interactions between different stakeholders (i.e. 
different government agencies) to address a shared problem or cause (Nathan and Mitroff 1991). 
Organisations involved in the negotiation will have to agree on terms and conditions when interacting as 
part of a collaboration group (Nathan and Mitroff 1991), however, negotiated order is subject to change 
when conditions change. Collaborative negotiation allows government agencies with different 
perspectives to express their interests and needs, and to negotiate their differences and any changes 
required to make the collaboration successful. Incremental collaborative negotiation helps to build 
commitment from government agencies with different perspectives (Westley and Vredenburg 1991). 
Furthermore, the outcomes from negotiations have to be ‘sold’ to other departments within the agency. 
The ‘degree of interpenetration’ is the extent of collaborative negotiation that an organisation is willing to 
commit to (Westley and Vredenburg 1991). There are four common organisational “patterns” of 
collaborative negotiation and commitment-building identified by Westley and Vredenburg (1991): 
multiparty roundtables, joint ventures, strategic bridging and mediation which are shown in Figure 1. We 
suggest that each of these patterns are evident in ESA collaboration to achieve community warning 
outcomes. 
McCann (1983) outlines that negotiated arrangements (processes) are also needed by organisations in a 
shared problem domain. If organisations do not have the ability to negotiate, then they may not achieve 
and realise their objectives and goals in a shared problem domain. The five negotiated arrangements 
outlined by McCann (1983, p. 181) are as follows: 
(a) Assure that benefits accruing to stakeholders as a result of their involvement are favourably balanced 
against their contributions over the long run; 
(b) Manage uncertainty and complexity within the domain by developing coordination and control 
mechanisms for implementing policies and programs; 
(c) Generate economies of scale or otherwise facilitate the efficient procurement and allocation of 
resources among stakeholders; 
(d) Help maintain the sense of shared direction and legitimacy of that direction by creating and building a 
visible identity for those involved – e.g., a legally formed association or cooperation; and 
(e) Provide an orderly process for adapting to change by building the learning capacities and skills of 
stakeholders. 
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Figure 1 (source: Westley and Vredenburg 1991, p. 69) 
 
4. Research Objectives and Questions 
This research seeks to identify opportunities to improve CW and thus EIR collaboration processes, by 
studying NSW government ESA practices as an example.  
These complex collaborative interactions are analysed and examined by applying McCann’s (1983) 
collaborative negotiated arrangements theory (previously discussed) as a means of supplementing crisis 
management theory, in order to answer the following research questions:  
 How do ESA collaborate to support and utilise CW systems in times of crisis through (a) stakeholder 
involvement; (b) dealing with uncertainty and complexity; (c) developing economies of scale; (d) 
developing a sense of shared direction? 
 How do ESA know if they employ the most effective and innovative CW systems to detect disasters, 
threats, incidents and hazards and then generate appropriate responses through (e) an orderly process 
for adapting to change (ICT architecture)?  
5. Research Method 
This paper documents the outcome of the first phase - diagnosing - of an action research study in the 
NSW government ESA. The use of action research is critical to the effectiveness of the data collection 
and analysis due to the nature of the multi-stakeholder environment of government ESA and their 
differing contextual modes of operation. That is to say, more quantitative methods of data collection such 
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as experiments, surveys and field studies would not gather the most appropriate data for interpretation, to 
detect the subtleties and differences between agencies, as deeply and effectively as an action research 
approach.  This approach has been applied to other industry sectors for the study of collaborative 
processes and ICT innovation (Bunker et al. 2007, Pang and Bunker 2005, Smith et al.  2006).  
The key component of action research of particular relevance to this paper is: the diagnostic component, 
involving researchers and other subjects in developing shared interpretation of community warning 
objectives, assumptions, information, process and ICT support practices; diagnosis also involves 
problems related to implementation of a particular design and achievements of the objectives. Other 
phases that will form later parts of this research project will be the intervention component (also called 
therapeutic), involving the design and re-design of community warning information, processes and ICT 
support based on diagnosis; and the learning component, involving distinct, ongoing processes of 
collaborative reflection on consultative practices underway and learning from observations of changes in 
these practices resulting from changes in the design of community warning systems.  While there are 
several different models and forms of action research, the most appropriate for this study is the canonical 
form as it implies cyclic, reflective, linear and rigorous process (Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1998).  
Each cycle in this process involves phases of diagnosing, action planning, action taking, evaluating and 
specifying learning (Figure 2).  
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Data was collected throughout the diagnosing phase using methods including: collection of ESA 
documentation on current CW systems plans and systems; interviews with key stakeholders; attendance 
and note taking at relevant meetings and thematic, pattern, grounded theory and hermeneutic analysis of 
documents, interviews and meeting notes to determine current ESA operations and CW systems issues. 
6. Data Collection and Analysis 
The NSW State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) commissioned this research project and 
is responsible for emergency planning for the State government. Among the numerous functions 
discharged by this committee is that of “arranging for graduated warnings to public”. The SEMC has 
adopted a Prevent, Prepare, Respond and Recover (PPRR) protocol which provides a common 
government strategy for the community warning activities of all ESA. 
The SEMC performs a high level co-ordination and response function for all ESA and subsequently has 
an overview of the further collaborative possibilities for ESA. This study represents findings from data 
collected in the diagnosing phase of the action research cycle from May 2007 to August 2007 conducted 
with a representative group of ESA participants from across the NSW Government (see Table 1). 
Figure 2 – The Action Research Cycle 
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Table 1 – Study Participants  
Emergency Services Agency Agency Role Agency Participant Title 
State Emergency Services (SES) Emergency services management in 
times of natural disasters 
Senior Management Team 
Rural Fire Service (FRS) Fire fighting and population control 
in non-urban areas 
Communications Management 
NSW Ambulance Service 
(NSWAS) 
Transportation and evacuation of sick 
and disabled. 
Director Management Co-
ordination 
NSW Police Policing and Civil Order  Deputy Commissioner 
State Emergency Management 
Committee – Office of Emergency 
Services (SEMC - OES) 
Emergency Planning Chair  
 
The analysis of the data from this stage of the action research cycle follows McCann’s (1983) 
collaborative negotiated arrangements theory for organisations and highlights the following areas of: (a) 
stakeholder involvement, (b) uncertainty and complexity, (c) ecomomies of scale in the use of ICT 
innovations (d) shared direction and legitimacy; and (e) an orderly process for adapting to change (ICT 
architecture). Evidence is also presented within this paper from notes and documents from a debriefing of 
multiple agencies (“Hunter Storms” 2007) and where there is a high degree of concurrence of opinion 
between ESA from individual interview data. 
Research Question 1 - How do ESA collaborate to support and utilise CW systems in times of crisis 
through (a) stakeholder involvement; (b) dealing with uncertainty and complexity; (c) developing 
economies of scale; (d) developing a sense of shared direction? 
(a) ESA Stakeholder Involvement 
There are many ESA (as well as the communities they serve) who are direct stakeholders in community 
warning activities. Each ESA has its primary responsibility and area of focus in the sphere of community 
warning. For example in the recent NSW “Hunter Storms” in 2007 ESA primary responsibilities were 
reflected in the activities assumed, and reported on, by each agency. Table 2 highlights these.  
Table 2 - Stakeholder Primary Activities NSW “Hunter Storms” 2007 
 
Major incident response in this case highlights the high level of collaboration and co-operation already in 
place within and between ESA and there is an ability to further build on this by developing a more 
comprehensive understanding of intra and inter-ESA community warning activities and processes and the 
technologies underpinning them. This has been facilitated though the PPRR protocol that was adopted by 
the SEMC. As we can see by Table 2 stakeholders can have quite different (but aligned) objectives which 
may require many ways of understanding the characteristics of the emergency incident and the 
community warning response to it. 
ESA Stakeholder Activities 
State Emergency Services Co-ordination of agencies and resources. 
Rural Fire Service Effective use of resources to assist in “troubleshooting”. 
NSW Ambulance Service Evacuation in wet weather (specialist knowledge). 
NSW Police Preservation of life, control of public reaction, search and rescue. 
NSW Department of Commerce 
(Communications) 
Management of hierarchy of communications technologies and 
activities. 
NSW Fire Brigades Emergency response, hazard reduction. 
Department of Primary Industry Animal welfare, inclusive response. 
Bureau of Meteorology Weather prediction model and public message management. 
Department of Community Services Human welfare. 
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(b) Managing Uncertainty and Complexity - Emergency Incident Scenarios & CW Systems  
There are many emergency incident scenarios that require a community warning response from one or 
many ESA. An emergency incident takes many forms and can move through many media (fire, earth, air, 
water, structures). They have agency (explosive, natural activity, chemical, biological, electrical etc) and 
an elapsed time to full effect as well as a lead time for warning. Incidents have dimensions of amplitude, 
magnitude, area and containment potential. They can impact the community on a local or social level and 
can be planned for or entirely random. Agencies stressed that CW systems and processes were highly 
dependent on the characteristics of each scenario and the agency responsible for co-ordinating the 
response. They also stressed that individual ESA operational systems and infrastructure were also key 
components of any EIR. (c) Economies of Scale - ICT Innovations and Their Use in Community 
Warning Systems Study respondents agreed that CW systems must reflect and cope with incident 
scenario complexity in order to enhance and support the collective ESA response to any given emergency 
incident. CW systems must not rely solely on any one information and communications technology (ICT) 
platform or delivery system (or indeed on ICT alone) to support ESA response and they need to integrate 
operational, community, communication and ICT requirements in order provide effective support for ESA 
activities.  
Table 3 – Warning Technologies and their Communication Uses 
M ES S AGE  TYP E ALER T NOTIFY 
W A RNING  
TE CHNOLOGY  
FRE E  
TO A IR 
TV  A ND 
R ADI O 
CAL L 
CEN TR E 
(DI AL  
IN) 
RURA L 
W ARDE
NS  
FIXE D 
P A 
P E RSO
NA L 
NOTIFIC
A TION  
D IAL  
OUT 
TON E 
AL ERT 
RAD IO  
FRE E 
TO AIR 
TV AND 
RA DIO  
CA LL 
CE NTRE  
(DIA L 
IN) 
RU RAL  
W A RDE
NS  
FI XE D 
PA  
PE RSO
NAL  
NOTIFIC
ATION 
DIA L 
OUT 
TONE  
A LE RT 
RA DIO  
COM MUNIC ATION 
B A RRIE R 
              
INDO OR S N N  Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y ? Y Y Y 
A S LEE P N N  Y Y  Y Y Y N N Y N  Y Y Y 
OUTS IDE  FLOOD 
ZONE  
N N  N N N N N  Y Y N N  N  N N 
NO P OW ER N N  Y Y  Y ? ? N ? Y Y Y Y ? 
NO TE LE PH ONE  N N  ? Y  Y N Y Y N ? Y Y N Y 
NO R OA D A CCE SS  N N  ? Y  N Y Y Y Y ? Y N  Y Y 
NO R ADI O 
RE CE PTION 
N N  Y Y  Y Y N  N Y Y Y Y Y N 
L ANGUA G E OTHE R 
THA N E NGLIS H 
N N  Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y N N  N  N N 
HE A RING  
IMPA IRE D 
N N  ? N ? N N  Y Y N N  N  N N 
 
 
Table 3 uses respondent data to structure a way of considering how each technology overcomes 
communication barriers and how they might be integrated with CWS in the most effective way.  The first 
row of the table considers the type of warning message, which needs to be communicated.  There are two 
types: alert and warning.  The alert message simply tells people that there is impending danger; the 
notification provides more detail about the type of danger and the appropriate response.  The level of 
detail in the notification message will be determined by the limitations of the technology and the broader 
content issues of the overall community preparedness strategy. Fixed PA is the best performing 
technology overall but it has its limitations and there are a number of criteria against which other 
approaches are better performers.  Respondents highlighted that a risk management approach is the most 
appropriate way to design an integrated warning system for all types of emergency incidents. 
Put simply, the warning system needs to get a message across to as many people as possible.  There are a 
number of communication barriers, which it will need to overcome, and there may be some individuals 
who will not receive the warning message because it is not possible, practical or affordable to commit all 
the resources necessary to overcome all of the barriers to communicating the warning message to them.  
(d) Sense of Shared Direction/ Legitimacy – State Emergency Services (SES) and Flood Scenarios 
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SES respondents highlighted that various types of warning technologies already in use should be 
integrated into a total warning system for the complex scenario of flood hazards (see Table 3).  
Respondents also highlighted that those warning technologies, which are already in place, would be part 
of an integrated warning system for the Hawkesbury Nepean area of NSW.  Respondents indicated that 
other technologies, if adopted, would integrate with the core elements of this warning system.   
SES utilizes a cross-section of information delivery technologies: radio; SMS; telephone; warden systems 
and are currently looking at the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) as another mechanism that may be 
utilised. Emergency Management Australia (EMA) are, on behalf of the National Forum on Emergency 
Warnings to the Community, undertaking to progress consideration of CAP as the protocol in Australia to 
be adopted for the electronic distribution of all emergency warnings. Respondents also believe, however, 
that technology needs to be as broadly defined as possible within the project in order to understand that 
the technologies applied to this problem may not necessarily be computer based. 
The characteristics of the “message” were also important to the type of CW systems in use. The volumes 
and frequency of information and how it is used; inter generational characteristics of information use; 
channel dependency of information; issues for non-English speakers; examples of “best practice” are all 
critical for effective CW systems. For SES face-to-face communications have proven to be the most 
useful in “imprecise” community warning. This includes door-knocking which is also used by NSW Fire 
Brigades. These respondents also stressed that technological reliant/intensive systems are more 
appropriate for high level messages and information provision.  
Social issues (and their effect on community warning systems) were also highlighted by these respondents 
and they felt that they have not been studied widely enough even though these have the greatest effect on 
outcomes. For example public expectation of community warning systems must be carefully managed to 
give a “realistic” view of what can actually be achieved by government. There are many different 
attitudes towards information warning and problem/hazard understanding. Education and community 
awareness (managing the message) is also an important part of any CW systems project e.g. how various 
media can be utilized more effectively to get the message to the community. 
(d) Sense of Shared Direction & Legitimacy - All Emergency Services Agencies 
A sense of shared direction and legitimacy was highlighted through the Prevent, Prepare, Respond and 
Recover (PPRR) protocol (as adopted by the SEMC) to CW systems in their various forms, showing the 
heavy use of publishing and broadcast technologies for the prevent and prepare stages with a move to 1:1 
communications technologies such as phones and SMS for response purposes. Publishing and 
broadcasting is then reverted to in the recovery stage.  In order to effectively follow the PPRR protocol, 
ESA and their CW systems need to use current proven technology with ability for continued scalability 
and enhancement to ensure best value for money. Alert messages must be delivered via a multitude of 
channels including telephone, mobile phone, SMS, facsimile, email, web pages. 
Respondents endorsed the use of an architectural approach to the assessment, development, deployment 
and use of CW systems which could be utilised by governments at all levels, to more effectively and 
efficiently utilise government and ESA human, ICT, information and process resources.  It was stated that 
such an approach would assist government in better targeting expenditure on CW systems. 
Respondents feel that a number of strategies and standards can be employed to assist ESA to more 
effectively co-operate and collaborate in community warning scenarios and develop a more architectural 
view of their CW systems. These include the initial implementation of: Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) 
Oasis V1.1 for emergency messaging interoperability; full state coverage with mapping and Integrated 
Public Number Database (IPND); and the use spatial data for mapping incidents where appropriate. 
There are also a number of other systems issues to be considered when developing an architectural 
approach to CW systems and these include consideration and evaluation of systems: redundancy; 
robustness; security; false alerts; administration/management; and levels of messaging - ESA and public. 
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Research Question 2 - How do ESA know if they employ the most effective and innovative CW systems 
to detect disasters, threats, incidents and hazards and then generate appropriate responses through (e) an 
orderly process for adapting to change (ICT architecture)?  
(e) An Orderly Process for Adapting Change – An ICT Architecture 
In the previous analysis we have seen that the theme of an architectural approach to the assessment, 
development, deployment and use of CW systems is emerging from the data.  Respondents felt that such 
an approach would assist governments in better targeting expenditure on CW systems. Having highlighted 
a CW systems architectural approach, it was then indicated by respondents that evaluation and 
deployment metrics for CW systems, were required, to accurately capture and measure all ESA 
operational and performance criteria. 
i) Designing a Warning System – Risk Management 
Respondents feel that no single technology or system performs well against all the identified community 
warning criteria and many of the technologies investigated have not been tested in real emergencies.  For 
these reasons any decision to invest in a technology or implement a particular warning system needs to 
recognise the uncertainties involved.  Respondents stated that an appropriate response to this situation is 
likely to be a ‘layered’ strategy that seeks to implement complementary approaches using a risk 
management philosophy.  Which particular technologies are combined, may vary according to the 
characteristics of the incident as well as the characteristics of the technological innovation on offer. 
ii) Integrating Technologies and Warning Message Content 
It must be recognised that designing CW systems is not simply selecting the technology or mix of 
technologies, which will be used to disseminate a warning.  It also involves carefully designing the 
warning message content which may vary between the dissemination technologies.  Furthermore, it must 
be integrated with a whole awareness and preparedness strategy for the affected communities so that 
when a warning is issued appropriate responses can be made. It was beyond the scope of this study to 
explore all of the community preparedness and message content issues but reference was made to these in 
discussing the relative merits of technologies and the design of an overall warning system. 
iii) Evaluation Criteria 
A set of evaluation and deployment metrics to effectively select, implement and operate CW systems, 
should be developed, in order to accurately capture and measure all ESA operational and performance 
criteria. These metrics also lend support to an architectural view of CW systems and give all ESA the 
means to benchmark and evaluate these systems under their own operational and process conditions. 
Respondents indicated that there are many different criteria to consider when evaluating CW systems 
covering such issues as: whether the system would alert, notify or do both; effectiveness of community 
warning messaging; cost of all aspects of the system (not just technology components); speed of the 
system in delivering warning information; reliance on the infrastructure of other organisations and ESA; 
community resistance to use of the system; and longevity of the technology components. 
The evaluation of the performance of each system against the evaluation criteria can be undertaken by: 
identifying information requirements for each system to facilitate the assessment of its performance 
against each criterion; contacting suppliers of the technology in Australia where possible and overseas in 
other instances, seeking assistance with information requirements; reaching a consensus with ESA and 
suppliers on assumptions needed to estimate performance; estimating performance with respect to the 
agreed assumptions; and cross checking results to ensure consistency. 
Sensitivity analyses can also be incorporated into metrics by estimating optimistic and pessimistic 
performance scores for each option against each criterion in addition to the best estimate performances.  
In addition, weightings can be given to each criterion (expressed by individual ESA) as to the importance 
of that criterion in choosing between technologies.  Applying these principles could lead to the adoption 
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of different technologies in different locations depending on the particular features of an area; and/or the 
use of multiple technologies in some areas to ensure that the limitations of one technology do not prevent 
the warning being delivered to most of the population. 
iv) Delivering an Effective CW System 
It is considered prudent by ESA respondents to trial the higher capital cost technologies in a small area 
first before committing to installing them and relying upon them across large areas of NSW. There is also 
a need to consult with the community and local government (councils) in the areas for such trials to 
ensure that they understand and support the need for pilot programs (the SES has evaluated technologies 
in this way).  Consultation will also provide an opportunity to gauge community attitudes towards the 
suite of warning technologies being actively considered.   
Metrics are a useful tool to ensure that:  diverse options are effectively compared against a wide range of 
criteria; traditional lower technology options such as door knocking and public media broadcasts are 
properly evaluated against heavily technology dependent options;  no single technology is relied upon to 
alert and notify the community; a layered approach with more than one technology will maximise the 
reach of the warning and provide backup communication in the event of contingencies;  any developing 
system incorporates community expectation and needs, emergency service capacity and decisions about 
public communications, and established community awareness and preparedness campaigns and reliable 
and compatible secondary information sources; and public warning systems integrate operational, 
community, communications and technology factors – a huge challenge 
It was stressed by ESA that to develop and deploy effective CW systems is a long process of informing, 
educating, reinforcing and re-education of the public for sustainable systems and a prepared community. 
No ESA accepted that CW systems could be effective in a one-hit emergency call or any single 
information channel.  
7. Conclusion - Contributions to Practice 
Analysis of the data collected in the diagnosing phase of this study highlights that CW systems are not 
only a technical problem but also one of management of information, the message and trust in the 
community. This is best highlighted by ESA where a high percentage of staff who participate in 
community warning and incident response are volunteers. ESA such as SES and RFS have critical 
interaction and collaboration with their local communities and it is though these interactions that they are 
able to provide such effective community warning strategies and responses. 
It is important to consider the many different contextual issues outlined by ESA when developing and 
deploying CW systems. In doing so, the effective use of these systems by ESA and the community are 
supported by, and entrenched within these systems. ESA respondents highlighted that CW systems: 1) 
have different (but aligned) ESA stakeholder objectives which also add a layer of complexity to their 
specification; 2) encompass different types of emergency incidents of varying complexity and so must 
reflect and cope with incident complexity; 3) must not rely solely on any one information and 
communications technology (ICT) platform or delivery system for their economies of scale; 4) need to 
integrate ESA operational, community, communication and ICT requirements to legitimise and give them 
a sense of direction; 5) collaborative processes require further and more detailed studies into the 
psychology, content and action resulting from messaging and 6) need to be developed and deployed with 
a view to adaptation and change. 
ESA currently use multiple CW systems to inform or advise the community rather than just one type. This 
tactic minimises the risk of a message NOT being received. In an emergency it is always better to receive 
a repeat of the message multiple times rather than using a single approach, which may miss, contacting 
members of the public. The reverse also applies when members of the public provide intelligence and 
information to ESA. ESA also use a range of (non technology based) public information seminars, 
training sessions, accredited courses and demonstrations to inform the public on the recommended actions 
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to be undertaken in an emergency. Printed material and facts sheets are also used by some ESA for public 
information provision and awareness raising. Significant issues still remain outstanding, however, with 
the intended meaning of a message and the re/action of the public.  
While much is being done to assess CW systems a significant amount of investigation also needs to be 
undertaken into the psychology of messaging, content and action resulting form messages in this field.  
8. Conclusion - Contribution to Theory 
Data collected in the diagnosing phase of this study has also highlighted a number of issues that 
contribute to the body of theory in this area. Collaboration theory in information systems is not very 
“deep” and relates mostly to supply/service chain management. We have been able to supplement this 
theory and body of knowledge (BoK) by focussing on and extending crisis management theory as it 
applies to collaboration for CW systems. Initial findings highlight that: 1) collaboration theories should be 
used to better articulate the CW approaches for government institutions (like ESA); 2) CW systems are 
multi-layered constructions (complex systems) i.e. no one system or medium will be able to do the job 
(different use and format of messages/information, applications, processes, technology & media) for 
various ESA; 3) command and control structures are important for effective CW systems use and ESA 
operations and need to be considered in a more strategic fashion when developing a CW systems 
architecture; 4) any CW system needs to function for an individual ESA as well as be made accessible 
(where appropriate) to all ESA (hierarchy of command and control); 5) public and media expectations of 
CW systems must be managed in a more cohesive and unified fashion; 6) education plays an important 
role in public impact and use of CW systems (public liaison); 7) global/local knowledge plays an 
important role in CW systems use and ESA operations; and 8) networking with communities and 
understanding societal/psychological effects of CW systems messaging is important. 
If collaborative benefits are realised across government in a more integrated way through the 
understanding and effective facilitation of complex inter-ESA collaborations between stakeholders, these 
will flow directly into more effective early warning and incident response for the general public. ICT 
resources will also be more critically evaluated giving government better budget outcomes, saving money 
from the public purse, as well as ensuring the loss of life, property and livelihoods are minimized to the 
community. We have shown that the crisis variables (Pearson and Mitroff 1993) of: types; phases; 
systems; and stakeholders, can be supplemented by a collaborative theory such as McCann’s (1983) 
negotiated arrangements theory to make sense of collaborative processes for CW systems.   
The complexities of such processes, the ICT innovations that support them and the circumstances to 
which they relate often lead, as we have seen, to significant problems. Providing better integrated and 
more collaborative information and process management, structures and activities around the ICT 
innovations that support early warning and incident response, will increase the effectiveness of all ESA 
and the utilisation of their ICT innovations in the long term.  
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